. Motivation
The Arrow -Debreu model, which is the canonical representation of interact ions among markets, postulates perfect credit worthiness. But i t i s not clear that this i s an accurate description of modern economies. Credit availability may play a substantive role both i n the level of economic activity and i n price formation.
O i~r work attempts to experimentally investigate the influence of credit tightnes:~ or expansion on activity and prices in a multimarket set-up. To this end, we design an experiment with t w o markets: input (labor) and output. We t r y to capture credit constraints it their simplest, static form: they appear, i n our experiments, as lower bounds on the balances of numeraire. We run several experiments a t different levels of the constraints for the buyers of output.
The experiments

. Environment
We keep the environment as simple as possible. There are t w o types of subjects, consumer-workers and consumer-producers. We have six, diverse consumer-workers, who sell input and buy output. There are also four identical consume~r-producers who buy input, transform i t into output, and sell it.
A:s is customary i n market experiments. we control the preferences, endowments and technology as follows. We endow consumer-workers w i t h i n i t i a l quantities of the input, and we assign them schedules of redemption values, positive for output bought, and negative for input sold. ,4 consumerworker's final payoff is the algebraic sum of her redemption va~lues (of the units of output bought and input sold) plus any sales receipts net of purchase outlays. Producers are assigned a transformation schedule; their payoffs are simply profits, i.e.. sates receipts minus purchase outlays. The schedules are identical, to the ones in Goodfellow and Plott ( 1 990). More specifically, for consumer-worker i ( i = 1,....6) w r i t e X i 2 for the total amount of output that she buys. and Li for the total amount of input that she sells. Denote by vi(xi2 ) i's total redemption value of Xi2 units of output (that she has acquired). The data are given as marginal redemption values A v~( x Q ) = V~( X Q ) -vi(xi2-1). where vi(0) = 0, i n units of the lab unit of exchange, the LeeXeta. Table I expresses consumer-worker i's marginal redemption values (same for a l l consumers). ------ Consumer-Worker Number W r i t e R i f o r i ' s t o t a l r e c e i p t s f r o m her input s a l e s , and D i flor i ' s t o t a l expenditure in purchasing output. For i = 1 ,..., 6, consumer-worker 1's payoff i s then T h e f o u r c o n s u m e r -p r o d u c e r s h a v e i d e n t i c a l product ion s c h e d u l e s f i (-y il ), w h e r e -y i l > 0 i s the amount of input used. The individual production schedule i s again given by the individual marginal o u t p u t s of Table 111 . W e w r i t e Af i(0) = 0. and, f c r -Yi, 1, 1 , A f i ( -y i l ) = f i ( -~i l ) -f i ( -y i l -1 ) . 
Input
Individual Marginal Output
Institutions
Both markets are double auctions. Any buyer can submit a bid (to buy) a single unit of a good at any time. Two conditions must be fulfilled for the bid t o be recognized as a valid bid by the market. First, the bid must exceed any existing bid that may be present i n the market. Second. the originator of the bid must have the a b i l i t y t o settle the transaction a t that bid. Similarly, any seller can submit an ask ( t o sell) at any time. Again, for the ask to be valid. t w o analogous conditions must be fulfilled: the ask must be lower than any existing ask i n the rnarket and the proposed transaction should be possible.
A higher bid becomes the current bid and a lower ask becomes the current ask in the market. Current bid and ask are the only ones standing i n the market a t any time: a l l superseded bids and asks are cancelled, i.e., there i s no queue. A transaction is executed when a buyer accepts the current' ask or a seller accepts a current bid. The price a t which the transaction is recorded is the current ask or bid. The markets are open for a specified period of time.
Both consumer-workers and consumer-producers are subject t o a credit constraint: the balance of receipts minus expenditures cannot be lower than a prespecified level a t any point i n t i m e . The level i s constant across experiments i n what concerns consumer-producers, but takes different values for consumer-workers. In a given experiment consumer-workers are assigned a certain level k of maximal indebtedness: this defines their credit constraints.
We ran sixteen experiments at several levels of k ranging from k = 0 t o k = 1000, and w i t h a variable number of iterations or periods i n each experiment.
A l l periods of a given experiment have the same subjects, but, otherwise, each period i s independent from any other one. In particular, balances of numeraire cannot be carried from a period to the next one, and the payoffs i n a period are unrelated t o what happens i n any other one. We compare last-per~.od levels of transactions i n input and output, and some statistic of the prices a t which transact ions take place.
A summary of the experimental results i s provided i n Table I V and Figures 1-5. Each row of Table IV corresponds t o one of the sixteen experiments and offers some values obtained i n the last period of the experiment. The first column is the credit l i m i t k. The second (resp. third) one i s the total number of transactions in input (resp. output). The 'fourth (resp. f i f t h ) column lists the average price a t which input (resp. output) transactions took place. The entry in the sixth column divides the fourth column by the f i f t h one: thus, it gives the relative input price or "real wage.' The last column displays the 'relative efficiency," i.e., the gains from trade (or sum of 6 producers' and consumers' surpluses) Xi , , [ V~( X Q ) -ci(Li)], relative t o their maximal value, which i s the one in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
The last row of Table IV gives, for reference purposes, the Arrow -Debreu equilibrium values. (7) ' The average level of transact ions is bounded well above zero, no matter how low k is (input transactions, for instance, do not drop below 5 units per period. while they average between 8 and 9 at high k's). Efficiency (8) El f ficiency is close to 100% for h i g h k's: when k is low, efficiency oscillates 'from below 50 percent to the h i g h 90 percents.
3. Double-auction experiments and price-taking models T h e trading institution i n the experiments is a double auction. Models of rational behavior i n double auction are few and involve a h i g h degree of complexity. Wilson's (1987) is the best know analysis of double auction as a game of incomplete information. Efforts h a v e also been made to model double auction as a g a m e of complete information. Neither of these game-theoretical models nor other attempts have been completely successful 1 . On the other hand, since Smith (1962) it has been known that, i n laboratory experiments, double-auction institutions consistently produce efficient allocations and prices close to the predictions of price-taking models. These predictions are See Frieclman (1 993) for references.
even sustained when subjects are random decision-makers as i n Bosch and Sunder 1:1994). It i s therefore natural that. as long as we are not concerned w i t h the dynamics of individual behavior, we look at a price-taking model, like the general equilibrium approach of Arrow-Debreu, t o provide the theoretical underpin~nings of the market-wide outcomes observed i n the laboratory.
An Arrow-Debreu model with credit constraints
The formal model is Arrow-Debreu's ( w i t h three goods and quasilinear preferences, i.e., linear i n the numeraire good) except that i t has the added feature of credit constraints.
We describe it i n the detailed, canonical format.
We first formalize the agents i n the model: firms and consumers. There are four firms. Firm i ( i = 1 ,..., 4) is defined by the production set:
where R i i s the domain on which f i is defined (a subset of the: nonpositive integers i n our experimental environment), and where we follow the general equilibrium convention of writing the use of an input as a nonpositive number Y i l , and the supply of output as a nonnegative number Yi2.
There are 10 consumers i n total. Consumers 1 t o 6 are! the formal counterparts of the experimental consumer-workers. Consumer i, i = 7, ..., 10, is a fictional consumer-capitalist. sole owner of firm i-6, and interested only i n the consumption of numeraire.
The experimental payoff data induce an agent's preferences i n a rather incontestable way, as soon as we accept the premise that she prefers a higher Because credit constraints place lower bounds on the holdings of the numeraire good, income effects may appear a t the boundary. !when credit constraints are binding. despite the quasilinear form of the utility function.
" the consumption set f 1 x X g x R , where = {oil } -XI , X1 i s the set of values Li of the input for which C i is defined, and X 2 is the set of values Xi2 for which V i is defined ( We emphasize that the modelling of preferences and technology follows quite unambiguously from the data i n the experimental environment: t o the extent that we are entitled t o assume that the experimental subjects prefer larger payoffs, there is l i t t l e freedom i n formalizing their preferences.
Modelling behavior is quite another matter. To this we turn now.
We postulate that all agents take as given the market price of input w, the market price of output p, and the price of the numeraire good. which i s identically equal to one.
They also take as given some credit constraints. The experiment introduces credit constraints as a lower bound on the net balances of numeraire Formally, i f we denote by z t the difference between expenditures and receipts up t o instant t. the actual experimental rule requires z t 5 k , for a l l t.
Dlefinition: An equilibrium for the credit constraints k is a vector such that:
2.
Fo~r i = 1 ...., 4, ml , K2 ) maximizes Tyi2 + F y i l on Yi. 
3.
The effects of credit constraints
Take a (w,p) i n S* and define E = (w, p. {(Li*, Xi2 *, xis*), i = 1 ,..., 61, {xi3*. i = 7 ,..., 10). {(yil *, Yi2 *). i = 1 ,..., 4}), i.e., E i s an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. For i= 1, .... 6 define = PXi2 * -w L i * , and r= max i 11 6) [T;. It i s clear that i f k then E i s an equilibrium for the credit constraints k, because E satisfies al.1 the credit inequalities at k. In other works, i f k 2 r. then E i s an equilibrium for k.
I f , on the contrary, k < then clearly E cannot be an equilibrium for k.
because E violates at least one of the credit constraints. Thus. i f k < IT-, then any equilibrium for k w i l l have either prices or quantities (or both) different from those i n E. In fact, both the price pair and the real allocation vary w i t h k for econornic environments of the type considered here.
The value r depends on the particular (w, p) E S * . It turns out that the interval of admissible r s i s the interval [78. 9 0 1 .~ As soon as the credit constraint falls below 78, explicitly solving the model becomes problematic.
The original model being discrete, it i s highly discontinuous. Smoothing out the data and choosing differentiable functions works fine for computing the ArrowDebreu equilibrium allocation, but the equalities and inequalities defining credit constrained! equilibria are fundamentally altered.
We lhave performed back -of -the-envelope computations for several combinations of discrete and smoothed data. which have convinced us that the Several of our experiments set k at 8 6 and 87, close t o the upper end of this range. T h e theoretical model postulated i n Goodfellow-Plott (1990) is the Arrow -Debreu model (see Sect ion 4 above), instead of our equilibrium with credit constraints. But because, as observed i n Section 4.3, for la,rge k our equilibria cloincide with the ones of the Arrow-Debreu model, the results of our experiments for k large replicate theirs. The overall picture is that our results do reproduce the ones i n Goodfellow-Plott. They obtain the convergence of quantities and price pairs to the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium values, and so do w e for large k. But we observe somewhat lower input prices, and on occasion higher output prices: this yields real input prices generally lower than the ones predicted by the Arrow-Debreu model and more prevalent i n the GoodfellowPlott experiments. At first blush, this could suggest the presence of some market power in the hands of producer^.^ But we feel that the double auction mechanism is rather effective in preventing the exercise of market power even with few participants. W e tend to adscribe the discrepancies from th~e ArrowDebreu pric~e predictions to the fact that, a s discussed i n Section 3 ;above and emphasized by Goodfellow-Plott (1 990, Section V), the isomorphism^ between double auctions and price taking is far from exact.
Lian-Plott (1 994)
This recent paper offers an interesting experimental test of the Arrow-Debreu model. We c:ompare it with ours along three lines.
Preferences
As argued i n Sections 2.1 and 4.1 above, preferences are givlen by the experimenter to the extent that subjects are interested only in their f i n a l payoffs. In our experiments, preferences are defined on three goods: input. output and the numeraire, and preferences are quasilinear (i.e., linear i n the nurneraire good). Lian-Plott, on defined on two goods: input and enter the utility function.8 5.2.2. Theoretical models the contrary, have non-quasilinear preferences output. They do have money, but money does not and predictions 7 Indeed, despite their higher relative input prices. Goodfellow-Plott (1990, footnote 2 ) view their own results as consistent with Cournot oligopo'ly. 8 Lian-Pl0t.t allow agents to exchange f i n a l money balances against input and output i n order to give agents an incentive to hold money at the closing of the experiment. The theoretical differences between Lian-Plott's money supply M S and our credit bound k should be emphasized. In the model of Lian-Plott. changes i n M S never affect real variables or relative prices, and generate equiproport ional changes in absolute prices as long as the velocity of money is constant. In our model, on the contrary, changes in the credit bound k have no effects (real or nominal) when k is high, and may affect everything (real variables, and absolute and relative prices) for k low.
2. 3. Experimental results
The economic environment of Lian-Plott i s different from the one i n our paper (which is the same as Goodfellow-Plott's): two goods versus three, and Lian-Plott's results on the behavior of absolute prices as M S changes are consistent with the quantity theory when the velocity of money i s constant. In
With several interconnected periods and some minor twists. For instance, producers maximize an increasing function of profits i n units of input, which i s theoretically indistinguishable from the profit maximization of the canonical Arrow-Debreu model. The redemption of final money balances referred to in the previou~s footnote implies that the experiments violate resource constraints (there is some final consumption of output i n excess of production, or some final use of input i n excess of endowments). But the violation i s quantitatively insignificant. their words (p. 261, "prices are on the order of proportional to the money supply."
In our case, increasing k when k is large has l i t t l e effect on prices. But. when k is low, prices move with k.
Conclusions
We report cm some double-auct ion. t wo-market experiments where subjects had t o satisfy an inequality involving the use of credit.
The experiments persuasivel,y display t w o regimes, characterized b y high and lclw credit availability (parameter k). The critical value of credit at the common boundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal c:redit use (among consumers) at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associated to our experimental environment.
Our rnain results are that changes in the availability of credit:
(a) have minor and unsystematic effects on real and nominal variables i n the high-credit regime:
(b) have substantial effects, both real and nominal. i n the low-credit regime.
Fact (a) can be interpreted as follows. I f credit availability is high, then the credit constraints are nonbinding, and can be ignored. The experiment then follows the tradition of relatively efficient double auctions inaugurated by Smith (1962) and continued by many others, including the later, two-market . experiments of Goodfellow- Plott (1990) and Lian-Plott (1994) . Given efficiency. i t i s not surprising that the outcomes resemble the equilibria of a price-taking model. An experiment starts with the reading of the instructions. answering a test t o verify the subject's understanding of them, and an automated practice period to enable subjects to become used to the computer's commands. After this, we run two practice periods of 10 minutes each. When these preliminaries are over, the experiment begins. I t lasts for several periods, never less than five, witln a duration of 7 minutes the f i r s t two periods, and 6 minutes the remaining periodstO.
A.2. Instructions (in Spanish)
I. Esencia del experimento Este es un experiment0 en el que tirnes que tomar decisiones de compra venta. L.as ir~strucciones son simples y, sii las sigues y aplicas con atencicin, puedes ganar unas pesetas. 2' u premio es pro rcional a 10s beneficios que obtenps en el rxperimento. Si tienes p6rdidas no ganaris nada, . ni nos t e n g s que pagar nada a nosotros.
1)
En este experimento vamos a simular dos mercados, que llamamos A y B.
2) Si eres "Participante de ti o I", tal como consta en las hojas que te adjuntamos, lee este apartado. Si no, para directamente a1 a p a r t i d denominado 'Participante de tipo 2".
'0 Some of the initial experiments lasted for 10 periods with a duration of 5 minutes each. I t was observed that after four or five periods, the results stayed about the same, which made us decide in favor of shortening the number of periods, to reduce both drudgery and cost.
Si eres "Participante de ti o I", vendes el bien A en el mercado A compras el bien B en el mercado B, a lo largo de lor varios perio 14' os de ue consta el experiment0 En las Koias adjuntas figuran 10s costes del bien A y lor valores de canje dei b~m%. Es importante que entiendas que significan 10s costes y 10s valor= dc canje. De manera que presta atencibn a la siguiente descripcibn. Para VENDER una unidad de A debes imaginarte que primer0 la adquieres, y ara ello pagas su coste, de manera que catfa unidad de A que vendas te costara el coste que indica la ta g la correspondiente. Por lo tanto, si vendes por encima del precio de coste hards un beneficio que se aiiadiri a 10s restantes beneficios que vayas reali;mndo, mientras que si vendes por debajo de este precio de coste tendras unas perdidas que se te descontaran de 10s restantes beneficios que puedas obtener. Dos cosas importantes respecto a este coste: La primera es que, tal como ves en la tabla correspondiente, cada unidad tiene un coste distinto, de manera cada unidad que adquieras para vender te puede costar m h que la anterior, etc. a segunda co!ia importante es que solamente te cuestan las unidades que vendes. Por ejemplo, si no vendes nada de A, tus beneficios en este mercado seran cem, per0 no negativos. Es decir, solamente tienen coste las unidacles de A ue vendas.
A1 COMPRAR una unilad de B debes fijarte en su valor de canje, tal como consta en la correspondiente tabla. Este valor de canje es el valor que nosotros te damos por este bien 8. Por lo tanto, si compras For debajo de este valor de canje obtendras un beneficio, tanto mayor cuanto mayor sea la diferencia entre el valor de canje 17 el precio que pagas. Por otro lado, no tendria sentido comprar por encima del precio de canje porque tendrias una perdida. Observa, finalmente, que el valor de canje varia con el numero de unidades adquiridas. Tus beneficios, en pro orcicin a 10s cuales ganaras tu remio en pesetas, se calculan a1 final d e cada period0 de que consta erex erimento, y no son mas que f' a suma de 10s margenes que obtengas entre 10s precios de venta de IPS unigdes de A que vendas y lor costes de estas unidades de A, mas 10s mirgenes que obtengas er~tre 10s precios de compra de B y 10s valor de canje d e las unidades de B adquiridas.
3) Si eres "Participante de tip0 2", compras el bien A en el mercado A, lo transformas en B y, luego, vendes el bien B en el mercado B, a lo largo de 10s varios periodos d e que consta el experimento. En las hojas adjuntas figura una tabla de transformacibn del bien A en el bien B. Observa que a medida ue vas adquiriendo mas unidades de A, la cantidad de B que puedes obtener a artir de una unidad de%i va disminuyendo. #us beneficios, en pro orcicin a lor cuales gmaras tu remio en esetas, se calculan a1 final d e cada P P periodo de que consta efexperimmto, y no son mis que a suma d e os precios que obtengas por la venta de las unidades de B que vendas, menos 10s precios de las unidades de A que compres. 4) Tanto si eres "Participante de tip0 1" como "Participante d e tipo 2", para comprar debes disponer de efectivo (CASH ON HAND). La cantidad de efectivo de que dispones aparece en la esquina superior derecha de tu pantalla. Observa que a1 principio del experimento aparecera alli una cantidad de efectivo, que puede ser cero o cualquier numero entero positive. A medida que vendas, esta cantidad se ira incrementando con 10s ingresos rocedentes de la venta, y a medida ue com res esta cantidad ira disminuyendo por el im orte de & cornpra. Si llega un momento en que?a cantigad de efectivo de que dispongas sea inferior afprecio a1 que se escj pa ando el bien que deseas comprar, o deberis dejar de comprar o deberas vender a l p para aumentar tu ekctivo con el que pagar la compra deseada. 5) Tanto si eres "Participante de tipo 1" como "Participante de ti o 2 ' : la informacion ue contienen las ho'as de c5lculo uede ser distinta ara cad. ersona es, or eEo, estrictamente CO&IDENCIAL. ES FJNDAMENTAE Q~~ ESTA I N F O~~~A C I O~N O SE TRASLTA A MNGUNA OTRA PERK7NA. Si re constata que esta informacidn es compartida se dara inmediatamente por concluido el experimento.
Mednica del experirnento
Desgraciadamante el programa con el que se realiza el experimento est5 en in les. Esto no deberia 'f constituir un pxnblema grave puesto que el numero de palabras que aparecen en ca a pantalla es pequeiio. En 10s parrafos siguientes indicaremos la traducci6n castellana de las palabras en ingles que aparecen en la antalla. burante todo el experimento cada individuo puede actuar bien como comprador (BUYER), o como vendedor (SELILER). En tu caso seras comprador en un mercado y vendedor en el otro. El mercado en el ue compres y el mercado en el que vendas vienen determinados por el t i p de Participante que seas.
Zn cada tranraccibn que lleves a cabo s61o puedes vender una u n i d a d , esto es la cantidad (QNTY=Quantity) siempre seri 1. Por ello, conviene que fijes tu atencion en 10s precios (PRICE). Por supuesto, durante cada periodo puedes llevar a cabo m i s de una transaccibn y, por lo tanto, vender (comprar) mas de una unidad. Esto es, una vez que hayas vendido (comprado) tu primera unidad, puedes vender (comprx) una segundn y asi sucesivamente.
Dotaciones iniciales A1 inicio de cada periodo, a cada articipante se le dotara de una cantidad inicial de A, que quedara registrada como sus existencias ( I N~N T o R Y ) iniciales. Esta dotacibn sera la misma a1 comienu, de cada eriodo de que consta el experimento. Cnda participante podri disponer de sus dotaciones iniciales como
Po d e w . Notese que estas existmcias iniciales puedm r r iguala a 0.
Asimismo, a1 inicio de cada periodo 10s participantes recibiran una suma de dinero en efectivo de X leexetas que aparecerri en la esquinn superior derecha de su pantalla. Nbtese que la cantidad de dinero en efectivo (CASH[ ON HAND) puede .ser igual a 0.
Funcionamiento del sisterna
Participante de Tipo 1
Durante cada periodo, cada ante del ti o 1 puede vender y comprar, de una en m a , tantas unidades como desee de A y c:$%ivamente. %hs trnnsacciones quedaran regirtrados en la casilla de existencias (INVENTORY). A1 final del periodo cada unidad de B en existencias (INVENTORY) sera canjeada automaticamente de acuerdo con 10s valores de canje descritos en el cuadro de Valores de w j e que se adjuinta. La primera unidad ser5 canjeada a1 valor de canje que se detalla en la primera fila del cuadro. La segunda unidad a1 valor unitnrio de la segunda fila y asi sucesivamente.
Participante de Tipo 2
Durante cada eriodo, cada Participante del tip0 2 puede comprar tantas unidades como desee de A (siernpre que &sponga del efectivo necewrio) y transformarlas en unidades de B que podri intentar vender. EstJl transformaci6n se realiza pulsando dos veces seguidas la tecla F4 y luego l a1 tecla ESC para volver a1 mercado. Notads que, como consecuencia d e la transformation, tus existencias (INVENTORY) de B aumen,tarin de acuerdo con la tabla de transformacih ue te ad'untamos.
N6tese que, para 10s partinpantes de tip0 2, sus existencias ? X N V E N~O R~, tanto d e A como de B carecen de cualquier valor.
A3. Tables (in Spanish)
The tables are handed to the subjects t o facilitate their computations. 
A4. Test (in Spanish)
The test was intended to ver instructions.
PART7CIPANTES TIP0 1
,ify the sub jects' understand ing of the Las siguientes preguntas nos permitiran saber si has cornprendido correctamente las instrucciones de este experimento. (Acula tus resultados antes de buscar la respuesta corrects, pues si te has ecquivocado a1 interpretar 10s dates que te darnos, podrias encontrar mis de una respuesta que parezca adecuada.
Toma la siguiente tabla como datos para tus respuestas: 
PARTICIFANTES TIP0 2
Las siguientes reguntas nos permitiran saber si has comprendido correctamente las instnlcciones de este expermento. &cuh tus resultados antes de buscar la respuesta correcta, pues si te has equivocado a1 interpretar 10s datos que te damos, podrias encontrar mas de una respuesta que parezw adcruada.
Supon que tienes la siguiente tabla de transformacion: n~dades de A Unidades de I. Si en un periodo has adquirido 3 unidades del bien A, ide cudntas unidades de B dispones para vender en el mercado B?
Para las sipientes dos preguntas, imagina que has adquirido tres unidades de bien A a 10s precios 40,25 y 145.
11.
A1 terrninar el periodo habiendo comprado las tres unidades de A y transformado en unidades de B, ha resultado que has vendido todas tus unidades de B a 10s precios de 50, 20, 60, 70,15, y de ahi en adelante, te han pagado 28 por cada una de las demiis. iA cuiinto ascienden tus beneficios? a) 61 b) -160 c) 117 III. 
AS. Some price dynamics
Next, we show the graphs of some price time series. The graphs have been chosen t o further illustrate the stylized facts described i n the paper, as well as t o depict the dynamics of prices. Figure AS-1 shows the pric:e dynamics when no credit is available to consumer-workers (k = 0). In this ten-period experiment, prices become lower and lower, as well as less and less volatile as the experiment develops. It may suggest that subjects become aware that some sort of steady state with low prices is reached and that there .is not much margin for strategic pricing. This complacency may be unwittingly driven by a rather high efficiency of the market, i n spite of a very skewed distribution of payoffs (i.n the last period, 2287 LeeXetas for consumer-workers vs. 6 LeeXetas for consumer-producers) .
11 A l l the (experiments show a very asymmetric distribution of payoffs . but t h i s i s an extreme case. I n the t w o other experiments presented i n t h i s appendix, the distribution of payoffs for the last period was 2352 vs 32 i n the k = 87 experiment, and 2246 vs 181 i n the k = 300 experiment. Notice that the fact that consumer-workers have no access t o credit, i f anything, it increases their payofli share. = 87, i. e., for a "critical" amount of credit (see Section 4.3). I t is worth noting that now the experimental price range includes the Arrow-Debreu prices in both inplut and output markets. In contrast to the previous example. prices show a higher volatility. even in the last periods. This volatility is not inherent of situatioris with high credit constraints. In Figure AS -3 we present the price dynamics of a four-period experiment with k = 300. These four periods followed immediately (with a two-minute delay) after a five-period experiment w i t h k = 750, involving the same subjects. With k so large, the credit constraint i s no longer binding, and subjects accommodate very quickly t o a stable situation with hardly any change in prices. Notice also that prices stay very close to the Arrow -Debreu prediction. 
